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In 1996, the California legislature took steps to modify existing 
contractual relationships between physicians and managed care 
organizations (“MCOs”).1 Legislative action was prompted by 
skyrocketing medical malpractice verdicts, cries from physicians about
unfair treatment caused by new payment systems, and media hysteria.
Regardless of which straw broke the proverbial camel’s back, the result
was no fewer than four bills that promise to forever change health care
in California. 
I. HEALTH CARE TURMOIL
In California, health care turmoil grows from the interaction of many 
forces. California health care law, although extensive, did not explicitly 
address the pressures exerted on both doctors and patients by managed 
care organizations. The common law doctrine of informed consent 
clashes with the manner in which courts interpret health insurance 
contracts.2  Moreover, uncertainty as to whether liability attaches to the 
actions of the physician or the MCO adds further confusion.3  Finally, 
extensive MCO penetration exacerbates these problems by permitting 
MCOs to exert a great deal of pressure on physicians by shifting both
legal and financial risk to the physician.4 
1. Managed care organizations are entities which arrange health care services by
providing enrollees an incentive to use a network of providers working directly for, or 
under contract with, the MCO and providing services based on pre-determined 
compensation arrangements and monitored by a management system which ensures that 
the services provided are both medically necessary and cost efficient.  James P. Freiburg, 
The ABCs of MCOs: An Overview of Managed Care Organizations, 81 ILL. B.J. 584, 585
(1993).
2. See infra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 13-53 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 54-92 and accompanying text.  
 657










   









       
  
   
   
A. The Law 
1. Informed Consent 
In California, liability for medical malpractice stems from failure to 
possess and exercise that degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by other members of the profession.  5 
Additionally, physicians must receive informed consent from their 
patients prior to performing any procedures.6  Stringent disclosure 
requirements grow from a patient’s need to rely upon the physician to 
learn of their health care needs.7  The scope of a physician’s duty to 
disclose is measured by the amount of knowledge a reasonable patient
requires to make informed health care decisions.8  When defining the 
physician’s duty to disclose, the courts carefully avoid tying disclosure 
requirements to a standard set by the medical community.9  A physician-
created standard would undermine a patient’s right to obtain all
necessary information.  Under such a standard, the only information
provided would be that which the physician felt is important,10 including
any profit motive which the physician may possess.11  Failure to obtain 
proper informed consent leaves the physician open to liability for 
negligence and/or battery.12  More importantly, a physician’s failure to 
obtain informed consent infringes on the patient’s right to make truly 
informed health care decisions. 
5. See Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976).  Rarely is the community
standard of care based upon “careful thought or scientific reasoning.”  E. Haavi 
Morriem, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 
1731 (1987).
6. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972). 
7. See Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905-06 (Cal. 1980). 
8. See id. at 905.  Adequate informed consent requires disclosure of all that a 
reasonable patient may find material, including a physician’s personal interests unrelated 
to a patient’s health.  See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal.
1990).
9. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9-10. 
10. Id. 
11. In making a decision to undergo treatment, a reasonable patient will want to 
know that his physician is free from profit motive.  See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483 (citing
Magan Med. Clinic v. California State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262
(1967)); but cf. Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest, The Limitations of 
Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG J. MED. 1405, 1406 (1989) (disclosure of financial interests is 
insufficient to inform most patients).
12. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8. Failure of informed consent is governed under
principles of negligence except in cases where there is clear deviation from the consent 
given by the patient. 
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2. Contract Interpretation 
The California Supreme Court addressed the issue of interpreting 
health care insurance contracts in Sarchett v. Blue Shield of California. 13 
The court carefully examined defendant Blue Shield’s contract language 
and retrospective utilization review policies.14  Plaintiff Sarchett first 
argued the contract was ambiguous because it did not explicitly state 
who would determine which health care services were covered.15 
Following the lead of an Ohio court, the Sarchett court stated “[a]
function, basic to the insurer, is the right ‘ . . . to determine whether  . . .
[a] claim should be allowed or rejected.’”16 The contract explicitly stated 
that a disinterested third party would decide which benefits were
covered, so that the insurer provided a fair method to decide whether 
they should allow or reject a claim.17  Moreover, insurers have the right 
to challenge the medical necessity of physician recommended treatments
in adjusting the claim.18 
The court then reviewed the case under the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations.19  Insured parties “reasonably expect to be covered for 
hospitalization recommended by the treating physician.”20  They  
“reasonably expect” that any treatment recommended by their physician 
is in accord with good medical practice and is, therefore, covered by the 
insurance plan.21  A carefully fashioned holding stated insurance
companies must construe insurance policy language liberally to meet
these expectations.22  Insurers must construe contractual uncertainty in
favor of coverage, although they may still review a physician’s 
recommendations for reasonableness.23  It will be the rare case in which 
13. 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987). 
14. See id.  In retrospective utilization review, the health management program 
reviews medical records and charts to determine if the treatment decision was 
appropriate. If not, payment may be denied.  See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY,
AND MORALS 112 (1993).  Denial of payment creates incentive to only perform necessary
services since the physician may not be compensated for those deemed unnecessary. See 
id. 
15. See Sarchett, 729 P.2d at 270-71. 
16. Id. at 273 (citing Lockshin v. Blue Cross, 434 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ohio 1980)). 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. Sarchett v. BlueShield, 729 P.2d 267, 273 (1987). 
21. Id. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
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the physician’s judgment is so plainly unreasonable or contrary to
medical practice to permit denial of coverage.24 
The court declined the invitation to declare retrospective review 
procedures violative of public policy. 25  Rather, the court noted Sarchett 
had been provided the option of enrolling in another health plan which
would have covered all physician recommended treatments, but which 
required the insured to use pre-designated physicians.26 
To be sure, Sarchett provided notice to insurance companies and 
MCOs that the courts will take a strong stance against the denial of those
benefits which insured parties reasonably expect to receive.  This is
especially true in instances when an insured’s physician suggests a
procedure will be covered. Thus, because the doctrine of informed
consent requires disclosure of all that a patient may find material, often a 
physician’s communications with a patient will create reasonable 
expectations of coverage. 
3. Where Should Liability Be Placed? 
a. On the Physician? 
In Wickline v. State,27 the California Court of Appeals analyzed the
possibility of extending liability to MCOs when they make inappropriate 
medical decisions.28  Because Ms. Wickline did not respond well to her
medical treatment, her doctor arranged for vascular therapy.29  After a  
series of complications relating to her circulatory system, Ms.
Wickline’s discharge date arrived.30  Her treating physicians requested 
24. See id. at 275.  While Sarchett argued that retrospective review should be
against public policy because it forces a patient to consent to a treatment that may later
not be covered, retrospective review at least “finances” the operation during the interim
period, allowing the patient to obtain treatment.  Although a patient may later find that 
they must pay for services, they have, at least, been able to obtain medical care.
25. See id. at 274. 
26. See id. By limiting physician selection in the program without retrospective 
utilization review, the health care provider controls the information given to a patient and
thus limits the care which may be provided. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 436 (1996). 
27. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987). 
28. See id. at 811.  Wickline is factually different from Sarchett in that the plaintiff
suffered actual injury resulting from denial of benefits. See id. at 811, 817. Prospective
utilization review was used in Wickline.  See id. at 811.  Prospective review evaluates
medical necessity in advance of treatment in order to screen out potentially unnecessary
treatments. See id. at 812; see also Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization
Review and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost
Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 27 n.112 (1993). 
29. See Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812. 
30. See id. at 813. 
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her hospital stay be extended by eight days.31  Unfortunately, a Medi-Cal 
decision based on factors unrelated to her circulatory problems allowed
an extension by only four days.32  Following discharge, clotting 
restricted circulation in Ms. Wickline’s leg.33  Ms. Wickline’s physicians 
readmitted her and attempted to save her leg.34  However, the
physician’s efforts were unsuccessful and Ms. Wickline’s leg was
amputated below the knee.35 
Ms. Wickline filed a medical malpractice action alleging Medi-Cal
negligently reviewed her medical situation.36 The court denied Ms.
Wickline recovery holding instead that liability attaches to the acts of
physicians, not MCOs.37  The physician’s medical judgment, not the
Medi-Cal decision, ultimately caused Ms. Wickline to be discharged.38 
Thus, the court stated in dicta that when a physician’s medical
determination is wrong, the physician may not avoid liability by merely
pointing to the health care payor as a scapegoat, particularly in those 
circumstances where the physician fails to advocate on behalf of his
patient.39  However, the court also noted that a patient deprived of
appropriate care may recover against “those responsible for the 
deprivation of such care, including, when appropriate, health care 
payors.”40  Accordingly, when a physician’s appeal for medical benefits 
on behalf of a patient is “arbitrarily ignored, unreasonably disregarded or 
overridden,” liability for any resultant injury may shift to the MCO.41 
b. On the MCO? 
In 1990, the California Court of Appeal, revisited the Wickline issues 
in Wilson v. Blue Cross.42 Mr. Wilson suffered from major depression,
drug dependency, and anorexia.43  Mr. Wilson’s insurance company,
31. See id. 
32. See id. at 814. 
33. See id. at 816. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. at 817. 
36. See id. at 811. 
37. See id. at 819. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1990). 
43. See id. at 877. 
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through a utilization review procedure, denied Mr. Wilson’s request for 
four additional weeks of inpatient care.44  Based on the utilization review
findings, Mr. Wilson was discharged.45 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wilson 
committed suicide.46 
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
which was premised on dicta in Wickline stating that a physician who
fails to advocate for a patient is liable for any injury the patient suffers.47 
The Court of Appeal found a triable issue of fact as to whether the
availability of an appeal by the physician would have proven “as a 
matter of law that his demise was unrelated to his denial of benefits” and 
subsequently overturned the summary judgment.48 
The Court of Appeal distinguished the facts in Wilson from those in 
Wickline on three grounds.  First, the decision of the Medi-Cal review 
board in Wickline complied with the standard of care required of 
physicians.49 Second, the parties’ relationship in Wickline was based on 
statute, while the relationship of the parties in Wilson arose from
contract.50  Third, Wickline was not a case where cost control corrupted
medical judgment.51 
c. Possibilities
Unfortunately, the Wilson court did not state exactly when or how
liability attaches to the third party payor.  However, a broad reading of 
Wilson in conjunction with Wickline permits several inferences to be
drawn about the placement of liability.  Essentially, the MCO will be 
liable to the malpractice victim when: (1) it improperly or wrongfully
denies benefits; (2) its decisions do not comport with the medically 
required standard of care; or (3) its decisions are motivated by cost
control resulting in corrupted medical judgment.52 
When deciding Wilson, the Court of Appeal was apparently concerned 
that a truly negligent MCO could avoid liability by advancing the 
arguments contained in the Wickline dicta. The growth of managed care 
in the years between the decisions may account for the change in 
44. See id. at 877-78. 
45. See id. at 878. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. Id. at 885. 
49. See id. at 879. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. See also, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Comment, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners,
Health Care Delivery and Its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 399, 427
(1996) (suggesting that when an MCO’s denial of care is a substantial factor in the 
resulting harm, liability should attach).
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position articulated in Wilson.  Unfortunately, since the decision in 
Wilson, the courts have published no further opinions discussing the 
placement of liability.53 
B. The Facts 
1. Demographics 
MCOs enroll approximately thirteen million of California’s thirty-two 
million citizens.54  In 1995, California MCO enrollment grew by 
1,325,818 new members.55  A 1995 study of six California medical
groups showed the number of enrollees covered by capitated health
plans grew by ninety-one percent between 1990 and 1994.56  The  
number of Californians in managed care will continue to grow, possibly 
at an accelerated rate, as changes in Medicare force more elderly into 
MCOs.57 
California’s five largest MCOs enroll approximately seventy-two 
percent of the MCO members (nine million MCO patients).58  If two 
pending mergers are completed, the resulting three MCOs will enroll all
these patients.59  As a consequence of these mergers, the amount of
53. However, some commentators have suggested that Elam v. College Park 
Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982), which holds hospitals liable for injury to patients, 
should also apply to MCOs because of the similarity of relationship between hospital and 
patient and that between MCO and patient.  See, e.g., Rex O’Neal, Note, Safe Harbor for 
Health Care Cost Containment, 43 STAN. L. REV. 399, 413-14 (1991). 
54. See Vincent J. Schodolski, Alleged HMO Abuses Spur California Ballot Issues, 
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1996, at N1. 
55. See HMO Enrollment Up Despite Profit Decline, MANAGED CARE OUTLOOK, 
Nov. 1, 1996, at 64. 
56. See James C. Robinson & Lawrence P. Casalino, The Growth of Medical 
Groups Paid Through Capitation in California, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1684, 1684
(1995). This is despite a California recession that resulted in a large loss of jobs and
correspondingly health insurance.  See id. at 1685. 
57. See Robert A. Rosenblatt, Big Increases in Medigap Premiums Expected in ‘97
Health Care, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1996, at D1; cf. JOHN R. WOLFE, THE COMING HEALTH 
CRISIS 10-32 (1994) (discussing trends in which the elderly are becoming a larger portion 
of the population). 
58. See David R. Olmos, HMOs Shut Out of the Latest Trends in Health Care,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1996, at A1; Robert E. Olsen, Employers May Want to Look at 
Care Options, BUS. INS., Jan. 27, 1997. 
59. See Olmos, supra note 58, at A1. PacifiCare is to acquire FHP and Foundation
Health is planning to merge with Health System’s International.  The third MCO is 
Kaiser Permanente. See id. 
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control MCOs will have over the patient market will ensure they will not
need to meet either the physician’s or the patient’s expectations.60 
MCO profits fell during 1995.61  This trend is likely to persist as
employers continue to search out the best value when providing 
employees with health care.62  Similarly, many patients shy away from
plans that allow the greatest patient autonomy because of increased
costs.63  Along with declining MCO profits comes corresponding
decreases in physicians’ earnings.  As early as 1992, physicians’
earnings had fallen by between twenty percent and forty percent in
California.64  Exacerbating physician’s troubles is a decline in demand 
for medical specialists.65  Accordingly, physicians eager to obtain 
employment are willing to take on extra financial and legal risk.  MCO 
manipulation creates a variety of problems ultimately affecting a party
with potentially even less bargaining power than the physician—the 
patient. 
2. Payment Mechanisms 
Most of the concern surrounding health care reform arises from recent 
60. See Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and
the Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 355 (1996).
Moreover, as the MCOs become larger, more powerful, and have access to a greater
number of patients, they can exert force over doctors in designing their contractual
arrangements. Cf. Mark Crane, What’s Holding Back Capitation, MED. ECON.,  Jan. 27, 
1997, at 162, 162 (small practices do not have the expertise to figure out if the capitation
contract is a good or bad deal); cf. Marsha R. Gold, A National Survey of the
Arrangements Managed-Care Plans Make With Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678,
1680 (1995) (finding that 84% of independent practice HMOs had some form of risk 
sharing with primary care physicians); Marilyn N. Nanzel, Bound by Contract and
‘Gagged’ by Its Terms, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 6, 1997, at 6, 6 (physicians in areas
with extreme MCO penetration are forced to enter plans with manipulative terms).
61. See HMO Enrollment Up Despite Profit Decline, supra note 55, at 64. 
62. See Jay Greene, Wondering Whether an HMO, PPO or POS is Right for You?
Your Options May be Dwindling, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 10, 1996, at K1 (some
companies are switching to POS plans because they cost 20-40% less than PPOs);  See 
also, Olmos, supra note 58, at A1. 
63. See Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, 
Reform Proposals, and Trade-Offs, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1319, 1343 (1996). 
64. See Robert B. King & Ben Moore II, Managed Care Past, Present, and 
Future, 53 ARCH. NEURO. 851, 852 (1996).  In New England, an area with lower MCO 
penetration, earnings fell by only ten to fifteen percent  See id. Physicians earned no
more from capitated plans in 1996 than they did in 1995.  See Crane, supra note 60, at 
162. 
65. See generally, Louis Goodman, Managed Care’s Role in Shaping the
Physician Job Market, 277 JAMA 72, 72 (1997) (contracting with primary physicians is 
increasing, but MCOs are becoming rather selective about contracting with specialists 
which has created a glut); Sarenea D. Seifer, et al., Changes in Marketplace Demand for 
Physicians, 276 JAMA 695, 695 (1996) (study showed the number of advertisements for
specialists has decreased in recent years).
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debate alleging that cost control measures affect the quality of health
care.66  Health care, however, has always been associated with financial 
incentives. 
a. Fee-For-Service
In years past, health care was paid for on a fee-for-service basis.67 
Fee-for-service plans compensate a physician for each treatment
provided.68  Financial incentives in fee-for-service programs prompted 
physicians to provide patients with excessive levels of health care
resulting in increased health care costs.69  Patients rarely complained
about excessive levels of medical care since they did not pay full price 
for the care they received.70  One result of the heightened care was that 
physicians were subjected to very high community standards when
treating patients.71 
b. Capitation 
Conversely, modern health care programs pay a great deal of attention
to cost control.72  Health care service providers use financial incentives
of varying degrees to control costs.73  While bonuses and withhold 
66. See, e.g., David Blumenthal, The Origins of the Quality-of-Care Debate, 335
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1146, 1146 (1996); Wendy K. Mariner, Managed Care Gag Cheats 
the Patients, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A19; Jeffrey L. Marxen, Unethical Pay-by-the-
Head HMOs Should Be Illegal, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Jan. 15, 1996, at 11. 
67. See, e.g., Robert H. Brook, et al., Health System Reform and Quality, 276
JAMA 476, 476 (1996). 
68. See Pedroza, supra note 52, at 401.
69. See Letter from Arthur Leibowitz, et al., to the Editor in 334 JAMA 1060
(1996); Malinwoski, supra note 60, at 356. 
70. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 161 (1996). Conversely, if care is withheld, the 
harm is physical and felt directly.  See id. Moreover, patients sometimes seek out excess
medical care because they do not pay the full cost.  See WOLFE, supra note 57, at 84. 
71. See Gary T. Schwartz, Symposium: National Health Care Reform on Trial: A 
National Health Care Program: What its Effect Would Be on American Tort Law and 
Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1361 (1994); see also supra note 5.
72. See Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604,
604 (1995) (hereinafter Rodwin, Managed Care).
73. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, 
Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330 (1996).  Bonuses are often based on a
physician’s ability to decrease patient care expenditures. See id. at 331. “Withhold” 
arrangements hold a percentage of a physician’s compensation until years end as a
measure to cover any patient care budget shortages.  See id. 
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arrangements may both effect a physician’s judgment, capitation 
receives the lion’s share of attention from the media and consumer
groups.74 
Capitation arrangements pay a physician a predetermined sum for
each patient in their care for a prescribed period.75  This sum is a 
prediction of the cost of the patient’s health care needs over that set 
period of time.76  Capitation provides incentive by directly linking a
physician’s compensation to his treatment decisions.77  Physicians will
not profit if the cost of care provided during the contract period exceeds
the capitation contract value during that same period.78 
c. Responses to Capitation 
Physicians have reacted to capitation in many ways.  Quality control 
programs now focus on identifying and limiting overused treatment
modalities.79  Physicians actively pursue measures to protect themselves 
from liability arising from the changing quality standards and financial
risk.80  An often-criticized method of risk avoidance is accepting only
healthy individuals into a physician’s practice.81  Other physicians 
increase potential revenue by accepting a larger number of patients into
74. See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, Payment by Capitation and the Quality of Care,
335 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1227 (1996). 
75. See, e.g., id. (“Capitation means payment ‘by-the-head’”); Thomas S.
Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Capitation or Decapitation, 276 JAMA 25, 1025
(1996). Capitation agreements, like all contracts, may feature specialized terms such as
including or excluding certain treatment programs. See id.; see also Thomas C. 
Rosenthal, Medical Primary Care Services in New York State: Partial Capitation v. Full
Capitation, 42 J. FAM. PRAC. 362 (1997). 
76. See Berwick, supra note 74, at 1227. 
77. See id.  “The problem with using incentives to shape physicians’ behavior is
the bluntness of the method.” Id. at 1228. 
78. See Tracy Griff, Capitation Shifts Financial Risk from HMOS to Providers, 
PREV. L. REP., Summer 1996, at 37 (hereinafter “Griff, Capitation”).
79. See Eve A. Kerr, et. al., Quality Assurance in Capitated Physician Groups,
Where is the Emphasis, 276 JAMA 1236, 1237 (1996); Rodwin, Managed Care, supra
note 72, at 604.  The most likely explanation is that incentive provided to reducing or 
eliminating unnecessary treatment.  See Kerr, supra note 79, at 1237; Rodwin, Managed
Care, supra note 72, at 604. However, in some instances a reduction in the care
provided a patient actually results in a better quality of life.  See Rodwin, Managed Care, 
supra note 72, at 604. 
80. See, e.g., Griff, Capitation, supra note 79, at 26, 37. Physicians should 
understand the risks of capitation in order to avoid them, explain to enrollees how 
capitation works, follow-up on referrals, and bring the MCO into the case if the MCO 
policies contributed to the injury.  See Tracy Griff, Capitation: The Life-Threatening 
Secrets of Managed Care, PREV. L. REP., Summer 1996, at 12 (hereinafter “Griff,
Secrets”).
81. See 1996 WILEY MED. MALPRACTICE UPDATE 239 (1996); California Hospital 
Under Fire for Seeking Healthier Patients, MOD. HEALTH CARE, Aug. 21, 1995, at 25. 
This practice eliminates the need to provide a patient with expensive medical treatment. 
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their practice.82  Others substitute outpatient visits in place of costly 
referrals and hospitalization.83  Capitation proponents argue that any 
departure from current capitation payment arrangements will increase 
health care costs.84  Similarly, they argue that capitation arrangements 
promote preventive care and thus better care.85 
3. Gag Orders 
MCOs have also invaded medicine’s ethical and legal arena.  Tales of
gag orders appearing in the contractual agreements between MCOs and
physicians are legendary.86  The use of gag orders casts doubt on the
ability of physicians to disseminate ethically and legally required 
information to their patients.87  In fact, some MCO gag orders prohibit
disclosure of a proposed treatment until the MCO has approved the 
treatment for the patient88 or expression of an opinion about the approval
82. See 1996 WILEY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE UPDATE, supra note 81, at 296.  This 
also serves to eliminate some financial risk.  However, it also results in limiting a
physician’s time with each of these patients and a corresponding increase in the use of
nurse practitioners for individuals who are not particularly sick. Id. at 296.
83. See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman, et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect 
Physicians Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance 
Organizations?, 321 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 86, 89 (1989).  Another interesting treatment 
supplement is the use of alternative treatments such as acupuncture and Indian healing 
techniques.  See Susan Kelleher, Hospital Prescribing Love, Medicine, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Nov. 24, 1996, at B1. 
84. See Griff, Capitation, supra note 78, at 37. 
85. See, e.g., Harry Rosenfeld, Laws are Needed on HMOs, L.A. DAILY L.J., Jan.
3, 1996 at 6. However, many believe patients are not responsive to, or desirous of, 
preventive care. See Henry Scovern, Hired Help: A Physician’s Experiences in a For-
Profit Staff Model HMO, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 787, 787 (1988). 
86. See Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk—The New 
Corporate Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706, 1706 (1995). 
87. See Julie Forster, California: Reflecting National Trend, Assembly Passes Bill 
to Restrict HMOs, WEST’S LEG. NEWS, June 13, 1996; see also Marxen, supra note 66, at 
11; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 86, at 1706.  Contracts used by U.S.
Healthcare, an MCO, contain the following language: 
Physician shall agree not to take any action or make any communication which 
undermines or could undermine the confidence of enrollees, potential 
enrollees, their employers, their unions, or the public in U.S. Healthcare of the 
quality of U.S. Healthcare coverage.
Physician shall keep Proprietary Information [payment rates, utilization
review procedures, etc.] and this agreement strictly confidential.
Id. 
88. See Mariner, supra, note 66, at A20.  These provisions are designed to prevent 
the reasonable expectation of benefits recommended by a doctor as discussed in Sarchett 
v. Blue Shield of Cal.; see supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text. 
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or disapproval of a particular treatment.89  Physicians in some MCOs 
may not suggest that a patient obtain services from a provider outside the
network.90  Additionally, MCOs enforce gag rules that prevent a 
physician from discussing their financial arrangement with patients.91 
Gag orders limit expenses incurred by MCOs by reducing the volume of
care provided to patients.92 
C. The Reality 
Applying the facts of the California health care environment to the 
relevant law provides a picture of turmoil.  The use of capitation and
other financial incentives forces the physicians into risky ethical,
financial and legal positions. 
1. Gag Orders 
Gag orders that prohibit discussion of non-covered treatments or 
referrals outside the provider’s network are especially troubling for the 
physician.  Failure to comply with these rules can result in a physician 
being terminated by the MCO. 93  Yet, failure to provide the necessary 
information violates a patient’s right to informed consent thereby
subjecting the physician to liability.94 
Physicians are not the only individuals affected by gag orders.  Gag
orders often prevent patients from learning about their health and health
care needs.95  While MCOs need only provide the services covered by 
their health care agreement, patients may wish to obtain necessary or 
desirable services that the MCO does not offer.96  Consequently, failure 
to inform a patient of these needs compromises a patient’s continued
89. Physicians and Surgeons: Patient Advice: Hearings on SB 1847 Before the 
Senate Rules Comm., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1996). 
90. See id. 
91. See Forster, supra note 87; David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact
of Managed Care on Patients’ Trust in Medical Care and Their Physicians, 275 JAMA 
1693, 1695 (1996). 
92. See Mariner, supra note 66, at A20; cf. Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra
note 86, at 1706 (most financial incentives are penalizing and a change in practice style 
is required to avoid the penalties). 
93. Cf. Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 86, at 1707 (co-author of article
was terminated shortly after publication).
94. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text; Rodwin, Managed Care, supra
note 72, at 605.  Lay persons generally learn of their health problems from discussion
with their physicians.  See id. Obviously, patients cannot demand services they are not 
aware that they need.
96. See Rodwin, Managed Care, supra note 72, at 605. 
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good health.97 
2. Financial Incentives 
Capitated plans provide incentive for physicians to choose only the 
healthiest patients.98  By picking only patients that do not need 
expensive health care, physicians can limit their exposure to liability.
One troubling aspect of this tactic is that patients with the greatest need 
for care are the ones denied health care.
Additionally, the level of care actually provided to patients is of lesser
quality.99 With the new inclination toward cost control, physicians’ 
practice styles must adapt to the new cost saving mechanisms.100  While 
it is possible that in some instance these new procedures will be better
for the patient,101 many may be harmful.  For example, as physicians
withhold medical services on a regular basis, the community standard
against which they are judged declines.102  Because medical custom is 
broader than health care affiliation, all members of society, whether or 
not a member of a cost -slashing MCO, will suffer.  While these changes 
will not happen overnight, some physicians opine that even the current 
health care system has softened a decrease in the standard of health care
97. See id. 
98. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
99. See Marxen, supra note 66; cf. Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 86, at 
1706 (“most HMO managers believe that large incentives to physicians compromise the
quality of care”); see generally, Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 91; Ellyn E. 
Spragins, Beware Your HMO, NEWSWEEK Oct. 23, 1995, at 54 . The changing health 
care environment also is creating a “race to the bottom” with investigation into the
consequences lagging far behind.  See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 86, at 
1706; see also Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients From 
Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 308-09 (1994) (reports of diminished quality
of care are commonplace); cf. Hillman, supra note 83, at 89 (capitation and salary
compensation programs are associated with lower rates of hospitalization than fee-for-
service plans). 
100. See,  e.g., Sharon Safrin et. al., Pyelonephritis in Adult Women: Inpatient 
versus Outpatient Care, 85 AM. J. MED. 793, 793 (1988) (discussing the need to find 
better medical procedures to keep health care costs low).
101. For example, research into new methods to treat pylenopheritis resulted in
reducing a patient’s time away from work.  See id. 
102. Under fee-for-service contracts, physicians were motivated by the potential for
great financial reward and the potential for allegations of malpractice.  See E. Haavi
Morriem, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 
1731 (1987). Thus, physicians provided heightened levels of care which led to a very
high community standard. See id. 
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enjoyed by patients.103 
Clearly the health care environment in California is rapidly changing. 
MCOs are rapidly gaining power over both patients and physicians. 
Moreover, the lack of certainty in the law and changing health care
standards indicate the existence of a large problem.  Accordingly, the
legislature, with the support of MCOs, took several steps to change the 
health care playing field.104 
II. EFFORTS TO REFORM THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
A. The Bills 
1. Gag Orders 
The legislature took a strong stance on gag orders contained in
contracts between MCOs and physicians.105  The legislature’s efforts
resulted in three bills. 
103. See Marxen, supra note 66, at 11. 
104. MCOs claim they support the new laws prohibiting gag orders. Physicians and
Surgeons: Patient Advice—Prohibiting Retaliation and Contractual ‘Gag’ Clauses:
Hearings on SB 1847 Before the Senate Comm. on Bus. and Professions, Cal. 1995-96 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).  However, it is most likely that MCOs wanted to shape the laws 
through lobbying and political process rather than leave these issues to the courts.  The 
apparent change of judicial viewpoint between Wickline and Wilson strongly supports 
this theory.  The lack of reported decisions since the Wilson case suggests that health
care providers would prefer to settle cases rather than risk treacherous journeys into the 
appellate courts in the face of adverse precedent. The lack of case law development may
also be tied to the use of arbitration agreements that are commonplace in insurance
contracts. See generally, Davis v. Blue Cross, 600 P.2d 1060 (Cal. 1979); Madden v. 
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976).  Arbitration is strongly promoted by
the courts.  See Madden, 552 P.2d at 1185.  Additionally, the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) is often used by MCO’s to force plaintiff’s to
bring suit against the physicians.  See How HMOs Have Hidden Behind ERISA, MED.
ECON., Aug. 12, 1996, at 200. 
On the other hand, physicians have indicated the legislature’s efforts may not be 
enough. See James D. Knight, M.D., Letter to the Editor, SAN DIEGO UNION–TRIB., Dec.
15, 1996, at G3 (arguing that in capitated programs, physicians groups, not the HMO,
make healthcare decisions, thus the HMO doesn’t care if treatment is provided).  This
argument overlooks gag-orders which speak to a physician’s ability to discuss alternate 
coverage arrangements or plan options which may prompt patients to seek better health 
care arrangements.
105. See, e.g., Medical Malpractice, Informed Consent, Unconscionable Contracts:
Hearings on SB 3013 Before the Comm. on Judiciary, Cal. 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. July
9, 1996). 
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a. Assembly Bill 3013 
As originally introduced, AB 3013 proposed that Business & 
Professions Code section 2056.1 should prohibit contracts limiting 
physicians’ ethical and legal responsibilities to patients.106  Several  
subsequent amendments substantially altered this rather simple 
legislation. 
The first amendment allowed MCOs to impose limits on a physician’s
ability to steer patients into a different health care delivery plan solely 
for their own financial gain despite language allowing discussion of 
106. 	 As introduced, section 2056.1 of the Business & Professions Code stated: 
No health care service plan or its contracting entities shall enter into a contract 
with a physician and surgeon that limits the ethical and legal responsibility of
the physician and surgeon to advise their patients fully about treatment options, 
alternative coverage arrangements, or other issues that affect the health care of 
patients, if the advice is consistent with the ethical and legal responsibilities of 
the physician and surgeon.  
ASSEMBLY BILL  3013, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as introduced Feb. 23, 1996). 





(a) The purpose of this section is to ensure that health care service plans and 
their contracting entities do not enter into contracts with physicians and
surgeons or other licensed health care providers that interfere with any ethical 
responsibility or legal right of physicians and surgeons or other licensed health
care providers to discuss with their patients information relevant to their
patients’ health care. It is the intent of the Legislature to guarantee that a
physician and surgeon or other licensed health care provider can communicate 
freely with, and act as advocate for, his or her patient. 
(b) Health care service plans and their contracting entities shall not include 
provisions in their contracts that interfere with the ability of a physician and 
surgeon or other licensed health care provider to communicate with a patient 
regarding his or her health care, including, but not limited to, communications 
regarding treatment options, alternative plans, or other coverage arrangements. 
Nothing in this section shall preclude a contract provision that provides that a 
physician and surgeon, or other licensed health care provider, may not solicit 
for alternative coverage arrangements for the primary purpose of securing 
financial gain.
(c) Any contractual provision inconsistent with this section shall be void and
unenforceable. 
(d) For purposes of this section, “licensed health care provider” means any 
person licensed or certified pursuant to this division or licensed pursuant to the 
Osteopathic Initiative Act or the Chiropractic Initiative Act.
(e) No communication regarding treatment options shall be represented or
construed to expand or revise the scope of benefits or covered services under a 
health care service plan or insurance contract.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056.1 (West Supp. 1997). 
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alternate health plan arrangements.107  At first glance, this language
seems to conflict with the stated legislative intent of prohibiting an MCO 
from interfering with a physician’s ability to discuss alternative plans 
and coverage arrangements.108  However, advocacy for personal 
financial gain is the more specific provision and as such must be 
honored.109 
A review of the legislative intent,110 which was to “guarantee that a 
physician and surgeon . . . can communicate freely with, and act as
advocate for his or her patient” provides a glimpse of a much larger 
problem.111 Whether or not a physician’s communications with a  patient
embrace the physician’s personal financial gain or merely represents the 
discharge of ethical and legal duties is a question of  fact to be answered
by a jury.112  Physicians are placed between a “rock and a hard place.” 
Disclosing better health care options to their patients may result in their 
being terminated from their MCO program while a failure to describe 
these very same programs may result in failure-to-inform liability.113 
A subsequent amendment states that physician communications may
not expand or revise the scope of plan benefits.114  This subsection also 
functions like a “gag clause.”  While the statute specifically states that a 
107. See  ASSEMBLY BILL 3013, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as amended April 
10, 1996). These changes were likely made in response to pressure by the California 
Association of Health Maintenance Organizations.  See Physicians and Surgeons:
Patient Advice: Hearings on AB 3013 Before the Assembly Comm. on Ins., 1995-96 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 1996). 
108. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056.1(b).
109. “[W]hen a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is 
paramount to the former.”  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1983). It is not
unreasonable to construe discussion for financial gain as being more specific than 
provisions promoting the general right to discuss coverage options. 
110. “In the construction of a statute the intention of the legislature . . . is to be 
pursued if possible . . . .” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859.  Statutes must be construed to
conform to legislative purpose in light of the scheme of which it is part.  See Lambert
Steel Co. v. Heller Fin., Inc.,  20 Cal. Rptr.2d 453, 457 (1993). 
111. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2065.1 (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). 
112. See Medical Malpractice; Informed Consent; Unconscionable Contracts:
Hearings on AB 3013 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. July
9, 1996). 
113. For example, a physician may be terminated by his MCO when he seeks to 
inform a patient with special medical needs about a health care arrangement which will 
better address the patient’s needs and which also has greater financial reward for the 
physician.  If a physician sues the MCO as a result of the contract termination, this 
question of the physician’s motive is left for the jury.  One can envision a jury focusing 
on the increased profits to the physician, and determine that the jury was acting in his 
own self-interest. See,  e.g., David Azevedo, Did an HMO Doctor’s Greed Kill Joyce
Ching, MED. ECON., Feb. 26, 1996, at 43.  The jury was allowed to hear how physicians 
are paid.  See id. at 50. After hearing how physicians were paid, some of the jurors 
stated they would no longer enroll in MCOs.  See id. at 55. 
114. See  ASSEMBLY BILL 3013, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as amended June 
27, 1996). 
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physician’s communications with a patient do not expand or revise the 
scope of benefits,115 those conversations may certainly create reasonable
expectations of expanded benefits.  By providing that benefits may not
be expanded, the legislature has contradicted116 and has seemingly 
sought to overturn the Sarchett decision.117  Physicians must carefully 
tailor their discussions with patients.  Discussion of a treatment plan 
which is not covered may mislead or frustrate the patient, cause the 
patient to lose trust in the physician, and possibly cause the patient to 
seek other health care options and providers.118  Accordingly, the
physician must carefully discuss medical options to avoid these potential 
traps. Thus, this legislation is in direct conflict with its express purpose 
of free communication between patient and physician.119 
Apparently, pressure by MCOs influenced the bill in a manner 
benefiting MCO interests, as opposed to those of the physician and 
patient. The physician must tread carefully to avoid tempting a patient 
into a more attractive health plan and must also be careful to avoid 
creating reasonable expectations of increased health care benefits.  Thus, 
the physician has been gagged—he is better off financially if he 
discusses nothing with his patients.  But this is not what the legislature
intended, is it? 
115. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056.1 (West Supp. 1997). 
116. Courts assume that the legislature, when enacting a statute, is aware of existing 
related laws and intends to maintain a consistent body of laws.  See People v. Vessell, 42 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 241, 244 (1995).  The legislature does not appear to have contemplated the 
Sarchett decision when drafting these new laws. 
117. This clause has two potential problems.  First, the patient in traditional plans 
may be forced to pay for coverage that was reasonably expected to be covered since
these new laws do not change what a patient finds reasonable.  Second, the physician in a 
capitation plan may be forced to cover the cost of treatment he reasonably believed was 
covered.
118. Cf. Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 91, at 1694 (discussing that patients 
lose trust in their physicians because of the use of financial incentives).  Moreover, the 
California Supreme Court has recognized that parties purchase insurance not only for
financial stability, but also to obtain peace of mind.  See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 
P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).  A misled patient may transfer to another physician or health plan 
when they perceive their treatment to be compromised. 
119. If the MCO is required to give a great deal of information about plan benefits 
and options at the time of enrollment, these provisions will not be so onerous since the
patient will have no argument that the physician created reasonable expectations of 
increased benefits.  See JERRY, supra note 26, at 147. 
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b. Senate Bill 1847 
In its final version, Senate Bill 1847 adds teeth to California Business 
and Professions Code section 2056.  In its prior version, Business and 
Professions Code section 2056 only suggested the “policy” of the “State 
of California that a physician and surgeon be encouraged to advocate for
medically appropriate health care for his patients.”120 An amendment to
section 2056 provides:
No person shall terminate, retaliate against, or otherwise penalize a physician 
and surgeon for that advocacy, nor shall any person prohibit, restrict, or in any
way discourage a physician and surgeon from communicating to a patient 
information in furtherance of medically appropriate care.121 
Before this amendment, section 2056 only stated that terminating a 
physician because he advocated on behalf of a patient, merely violated 
“public policy.”122 
Senate Bill 1847 underwent many changes before becoming the law of 
the state. The original version of Senate Bill 1847 proposed the addition 
of Business and Profession Code section 2056.3.123  Section 2056.3
originally stated that no entity may limit a physician’s communications
regarding 1) the nature of treatment, risks or alternatives, 2) the
availability of other therapies, consultations or tests, 3) the decision of
any plan to authorize or deny services, or 4) the process used to 
authorize or deny benefits.124  This language was initially modified125 
before eventually being deleted altogether.126 
At first glance, the deletion of section 2056.3 seems troublesome.
However, the language of section 2056.3 was, to a certain extent, both 
picked up by other statutory sections127 and already covered by existing 
case law.128  The resulting statute permits a great deal of communication 
120. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056(b) (West Supp. 1997). 
121. Id. § 2056(c). 
122. Id. § 2056. 
123. See SENATE BILL 1847, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as introduced Feb. 22, 
1996).
124. See id. 
125. See  ASSEMBLY BILL 3013, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as amended Apr. 
15, 1996). 
126. See  ASSEMBLY BILL 3013, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as amended June 
19, 1996). 
127. Section 2056.1 of the California Business & Profession Code contains 
language which promotes discussion of the plan, including treatment options, alternative 
plans, and other coverage arrangements which replace the language of the proposed but 
omitted section 2056.3.  See  SENATE BILL 1847, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as 
amended April 15, 1996). 
128. Moreover, California law requires that physicians advocate for medically
appropriate health care, including discussion of any factor material to a reasonable 
patient.  By stating that a physician may advocate for medically appropriate care, 
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between a patient and his or her physician.
c. Senate Bill 1805 
Senate Bill 1805 modified California Health & Safety Code section 
1386 and added Insurance Code section 10120.5 which provides
penalties for violation of California Business & Professions Code 
sections 510129, 2056, or 2056.1.130  A breach of any of these sections
requires the MCO’s license to be either suspended or revoked.131 
Additionally, under Insurance Code section 10120.5, violation of
sections 510, 2056, or 2056.1 is a violation of the Insurance Code.132 
Initially, Senate Bill 1805 also proposed the adoption of Health & 
Safety Code section 1366.16 in addition to Insurance Code Section 
10120.5.133  The language of Health & Safety Code section 1366.16 was 
similar to that of Business & Professions Code sections 2056 and 
2056.1.134  At the insistence of the Department of Corporations, the
legislature dropped Health & Safety Code section 1366.16 to avoid 
potential conflict with similar “intent” language contained in the
Business & Professions Code.135  The Department of Corporations,
however, recommended modification be made so that the penalty for
violating the “intent” language would have some effect.136  In its final
form, Senate Bill 1805 met a good balance; it provided enforcement 
mechanisms for Business & Professions Code sections 510, 2056 and 
2056.1, while avoiding potential conflict due to the redundancy.
contract provisions previously which resulted in gag orders have been abrogated.  See 
supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. 
129. Section 510 of the Business & Professions Code provides that “[i]t is the
public policy of the State of California that a health care practitioner be encouraged to 
advocate for his or her patients.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 510 (West Supp. 1997). 
130. See  SENATE BILL 1805, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as amended Aug. 5, 
1996).
131. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1386 (West Supp. 1997). 
132. CAL. INS. CODE § 10120.5 (West Supp. 1997). 
133. See SENATE BILL 1805, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as introduced Feb. 22, 
1996).
134. See id. 
135. See Health Care Coverage: Hearings on SB 1805 Before the Assembly Comm. 
on Ins., Cal. 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. June 25, 1996). 
136. See id. 
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2. Financial Incentives—Assembly Bill 2649 
Chapter 1014 is the final version of Assembly Bill 2649.137 This bill
limits financial incentives that induce physicians “to deny, reduce, limit,
or delay specific medically necessary and appropriate services.”138  This
language appears in the amended portion of Business and Professions 
Code section 511, Health and Safety Code section 1348.6, and Insurance 
Code section 10175.5.139  These code sections contain language 
expressly permitting capitation arrangements which are not tied to 
specific medical decisions.140  The final version of Health and Safety
Code section 1367.1 requires every health plan to disclose 1) how 
participation may affect the person’s choice of a physician, hospital, or 
other health care providers, 2) the basic method of reimbursement, and 
3) whether the plan uses financial incentives.141 
When originally introduced by Assemblyman Thompson, Assembly
Bill 2649 was a “get tough” proposition.  The bill prohibited tying
financial incentives to any inducement to deny or limit necessary
 137. ASSEMBLY BILL 2649, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (enacted). 
138. Id. 
139. See generally, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6 (West Supp. 1997);
CAL. INS. CODE § 10175.5 (West Supp. 1997); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 511 (West
Supp. 1997). Section 511 of California Business & Professions Code appeared in its
final form as follows: 
Section 511: Proscription on payment to health care practitioner to deny, limit, 
or delay services 
(a) No subcontract between a physician and surgeon, physician and surgeon
group, or other licensed health care practitioner who contracts with a health 
care service plan or health insurance carrier, and another physician and
surgeon, physician and surgeon group, or licensed health care practitioner, 
shall contain any incentive plan that includes a specific payment made, in any 
type or form, to a physician and surgeon, physician and surgeon group, or
other licensed health care practitioner as an inducement to deny, reduce, limit,
or delay specific, medically necessary, and appropriate services covered under 
the contract with the health care service plan or health insurance carrier and
provided with respect to a specific enrollee or groups of enrollees with similar 
medical conditions. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit subcontracts that 
contain incentive plans that involve general payments such as capitation
payments or shared risk agreements that are not tied to specific medical
decisions involving specific enrollees or groups of enrollees with similar
medical conditions. 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 511.  Section 1348.6 of the Health and Safety Code is
substantially similar to section 10175.5 of the Insurance Code and the operative language 
is the same in all three statutes.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6; CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10175.5.
140. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6; CAL. INS. CODE § 10175.5; CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 511. The trouble with this language is that capitation is still tied to 
reduction of care in a general sense. 
141. See supra note 127. 
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services.142  At its introduction, Assembly Bill 2649 contained Health &
Safety Code section 1348.7 which required health care service providers 
to report their compensation arrangements to the Commissioner of 
Corporations for review and approval.143  Ultimately, the original
proposal contained Health & Safety Code section 1348.8 which required
that compensation arrangements 1) be based on actuarially sound data, 
which would be available to the physicians, 2) adjust to reflect severity 
of illness, 3) offer stop-loss coverage to all physicians, and 4) provide
capitation payment to the first primary care physician that sees a patient 
dating back to the patient’s enrollment date.144  These provisions shift 
the financial risks of capitation arrangements back to the MCO. 
Despite minor language changes, the bill left the Assembly in virtually 
the same form as it was born.145  The Senate, however, substantially 
revised Assemblyman Thompson’s bill.  At the insistence of several
opponents, the bill was stripped of both language requiring reporting to 
the Department of Corporations as well as all of the capitation control
devices146 before its August 15, 1996 presentation.147  Before giving the
bill final approval, the Senate eliminated all references to review and 
approval by the Department of Corporations and capitation
agreements.148  The result was a bill purporting to eliminate financial
incentives, yet allowing MCOs to continue to exert strong influence over 
142. See ASSEMBLY BILL 2649, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as introduced Feb. 
21, 1996). 
143. See id. 
144. See id. The purpose of this arrangement is to compensate the physician 
providing treatment for the capitation payments for the period in which the patient was a 
plan member but did not have a primary care physician. 
145. See ASSEMBLY BILL 2649, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as amended May
29, 1996). 
146. See  ASSEMBLY BILL 2649, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as amended Aug. 
15, 1996). 
147. Hearings on AB 2649 Before the Senate Comm. on Ins., 1995-96 Reg. Sess.
(July 3, 1996); Health Care Service Plan Contracts: Hearings on AB 2649 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 7, 1996) (committee reports 
indicate that the Department of Corporations, Department of Health Services, the 
California Association of Health Maintenance Organizations, and the Association of 
California Life and Health Insurance Companies all fought for removal of language 
restricting the manner in which capitation rates are calculated). 
148. See ASSEMBLY BILL 2649, Reg. Sess. 1995-96, (1996) (as amended August 26, 
1996). A possible reason that MCOs pushed for removal of all reporting requirements is 
that in late 1994 the California Department of Corporations issued a $500,000 penalty to
a MCO that denied a patient coverage for treatment.  See David Azevedo, Will the States
Get Tough With HMOs?, MED. ECON., Aug. 26, 1996, at 172, 184.  That penalty is
believed to be the largest ever levied against an MCO.  See id. 
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physicians with restrictive capitation payment mechanisms.  In fact, the 
legislature has not even required that capitation arrangements be
actuarially sound.149 
B. The Effects 
What is the result of legislative efforts to reform managed care in 
California?  Not what one would hope it would be!  Physicians 
essentially are now subject to gag orders written by the legislature 
instead of MCOs. Obviously then, MCOs need not even place gag 
clauses in contracts, for the legislature has taken care of that for them. 
Consequently, the MCOs cannot be found liable for the failure of a 
gagged physician to advocate on behalf of a patient.
Regardless of this consequence, prohibiting financial incentives to 
reduce or deny care is a step toward physician independence and patient 
benefit. By prohibiting financial incentives, the California legislature 
sought to remove the ability of an MCO to corrupt a physician’s 
judgment through measures designed to control costs.  By removing
financial incentives, a physician’s conduct is directed at patient care as
opposed to cost control.
However, the legislature removed the opportunity for injured patients 
to argue both that the third party payor contributed to the injury by
arbitrarily ignoring or overriding the doctor’s appeal and that MCO cost
control measures corrupted the medical decision.  Physicians now make
most of the final decisions regarding the care provided to patients.  They
cannot avoid liability by properly advocating to the MCO as suggested
by Wickline because they, not the MCO utilization review board, now 
make the ultimate treatment decision.150  Essentially, under current
health care compensation arrangements, physicians have become the
third party payor.151  Moreover, physicians are precluded from shifting
liablity to the MCO under arguments derived from Wilson and Wickline 
149. From the final version of the bill, one can infer that the removal of 
requirements for actuarial soundness, stop-loss protections, etc. during the legislative 
process indicates a legislative intent not to require programs to be financially sound. 
Moreover, Medi-Cal recipients are covered by capitated health plans with provisions for
determining capitation rates based on age, sex, and aid categories which are to be 
determined by actuaries or consulting groups.  See  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14301
(West Supp. 1997). 
150. Cf. Pedroza, supra note 52, at 429 (discussing that liability should attach to the 
physician alone because the doctor is the party who makes the medical decision).
151. Third party payors, by shifting all medical decisions to the physician, have
removed themselves from the group being charged with making care decisions.  See
James D. Knight, M.D., Letter to the Editor, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 15, 1996, at 
G3.
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that the MCO denied their medical treatment.152  Whatever decision the
physician makes, the MCO cannot be found to have caused the patient’s 
injury even though the MCO corrupted the physician’s medical 
judgment.153  The physician is subject to considerable liability should the
course of treatment go awry and also subject to the economic pinch of an
unregulated capitation program.  This point highlights the incredible 
conflict which is inherent. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The California legislative body needs to revisit its recent efforts at
health care reform. Their primary goal should be promoting free 
communication.  In addition, the legislature should endeavor to spread
risk to those who best able to bear it and require disclosure of the 
important financial aspects by those best able to distribute that 
information—in both instances the MCOs.
A. Gag Orders 
The three bills designed to prevent MCO contracts from containing 
gag orders or other constraints on a physician’s ethical or legal
obligation are a step in the right direction.  However, the ambiguity in
defining what constitutes a physician acting in his own financial interest
is a major problem left unresolved by the legislature.
1. Removing The Jury Question by Creating an Evidentiary 
Mechanism 
As enacted, Business & Professions Code section 2056.1 permits
MCOs to continue exerting substantial control over physicians.154 
Physicians are trapped in the ominous situation of choosing to protect 
152. See  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (West Supp. 1997); Wickline v. State,
239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (stating in dicta that liability should attach to the person, including
health care payors, who makes the decision to deny necessary care); see also, Griff, 
Secrets, supra note 80, at 13 (an unreported 1993 California jury verdict against an MCO 
awarded plaintiff $89.3 million because the MCO refused to provide treatment.); 
Pedroza, supra note 52, at 429. 
153. Attorney Mark Hiepler has presented arguments that the financial incentives of 
an MCO interfere with a physicians fiduciary duty to the patient.  While the claim was 
dismissed, the changing health care environment may prompt courts to examine the
propriety of shifting more liability to MCOs. See Griff, Secrets supra note 80, at 12. 
154. See supra note 114-19 and accompanying text. 
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either their livelihood or their patients.  By informing patients in a 
manner consistent with the patient’s best interests, physicians risk
termination.155 Conversely, by failing to properly inform their patients,
physicians risk liability for lack of informed consent.156  Moreover,
physicians’ arguments that an MCO arbitrarily restricted dissemination
of ethically and legally required information will now be less persuasive
since the MCO is precluded from directly interfering with patient 
communication and the gag order has been placed by the legislature.157 
Furthermore, a jury is quite likely to believe an argument that a 
physician acted for profit motives.158 
To remedy this situation, the legislature should take a close look at the 
fine line between when a physician is properly advising a patient about 
their health and when a physician is acting for his own financial gain. 
Eliminating the question of fact aspect of the new law will remove the 
chilling effects of disclosing information that affects a patient’s health 
care decisions.  California law requires disclosure of all material 
information affecting a patient’s decision to consent to a course of
treatment, including personal economics. The new laws not only
interfere with a physician’s ability to discuss plan arrangements with 
patients but also conflict with their stated purpose.159 
A better alternative to leaving the question to a jury, would require a 
physician to prove that the patient was provided with complete
disclosure regarding the physician’s potential personal benefits as 
required by referral statutes.160  Disclosure of financial considerations
has previously been considered by both the courts161 and the
legislature.162  A document should be prepared at the time of the
physician’s disclosure. The document would be signed by both 
physician and patient and would describe the subject matter of the
conversations and the reasons for initiating the discussion.  During trial, 
this document would create a rebuttable presumption that the physician
acted in the patient’s interest, and not his own, when making the 
disclosure. 
Under this program, patients would receive a great deal of information 
about their health care.  Moreover, costs would be kept under control 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. See supra notes 109-19, 149-52 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra note 113. 
159. See supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text. 
160. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650.01(f) (West Supp. 1997) (permitting
referrals only where the patient has received disclosure of the physician’s financial
interest in writing).
161. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
162. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650.01(f) (West Supp. 1997). 
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since the consumer would consider price in selecting an MCO.163 In 
fact, the potential of losing the informed patient to more expensive 
programs or to another MCO would likely pressure MCOs to create
more patient-friendly programs.
B. Capitation/Financial Incentives 
The interaction of the new anti-gag order laws with capitation 
programs creates additional problems.  Allowing an MCO to insulate 
itself from liability by forcing physicians to bear all the risks associated
with a medical decision is flawed.164  The physician has little control
over his contractual agreement, and most physicians are in the business
of patient care, not underwriting that care.  The extent of MCO 
penetration in California requires affording some protection to the 
physicians and patients.165 Contractual bargaining power is held nearly
exclusively by the MCO. The MCOs force arrangements upon
physicians which are often one sided and unduly place financial and 
legal risk on the physician.  This is especially true since new capitation 
arrangements are not even required to be actuarially sound.
The legislature can remedy these problems by introducing laws that
either decrease risk or shift the risk back to the MCO.  Decreasing the 
risk in capitation plans may best be achieved by considering both the 
contents of the early version of Assembly Bill 2649 and physician
recommendations.  These include large patient pools, stop-loss 
provisions, and actuarial soundness. 
163. “Patients’ interests as both payers and recipients of medical care may conflict.”  
Rodwin, Managed Care, supra note 72, at 604.  In effect, this proposal would create a 
stratified health care system in which those willing to pay more would receive more.  See
Malinowski, supra note 59, at 352.  At the same time physician advocacy in shifting 
patients would be kept in check by the “informed consent” requirement.  Informed
consent requirements may be carefully tailored to insure that patients are properly 
informed of the plan provisions which would be especially important in such a stratified
system.  See id. Finally, those physicians who do not wish to engage in the strict 
requirements of insurance information transfer can avoid them by referring patients to 
the insurance company for specific coverage questions.  See id.
164. But see Pedroza, supra note 52, at 429 (because physicians make the decisions, 
they should bear the risk). 
165. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated
Health Plans, 22 AM. J.L. MED. 301 (1996). 
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1. Larger Physician/Patient Groups 
Capitation arrangements should encourage physicians to work
together. Pooling physicians’ financial compensation furthers this 
end.166  Pooling physicians’ incomes will force physicians to seek
measures which increase efficiency such as sharing information or 
developing synergistic treatment plans.167  Increasing the number of 
patients in the capitation pools buffers the negative impact of the few 
who require expensive treatments.168  Additionally, larger capitation 
pools will facilitate accurate determination of capitation contract rates.169 
A most interesting facet of this proposal is that while it would decrease 
physicians’ legal and financial risk, risk to the MCO would also be 
minimized as a result of the diversification and increased efficiency. 
2. Stop-Loss Protections 
Physicians often advocate stop-loss provisions as a method of 
reducing the risk they bear.170  Stop-loss provisions place only a
predetermined percentage of a physician’s compensation at risk.171 
Because financial risk is limited and determined in advance, physicians
need not worry about expensive treatments impacting their 
pocketbook.172 More importantly, the risk is shifted away from the
provider and towards the MCO, the entity created to bear such risk. 
Stop-loss plans have some potential negative aspects.  First, MCOs
often adjust contract terms to reflect the financial realities of stop-loss 
coverage.173  Second, MCOs often require stop-loss provisions to be
accompanied by stop-gain provisions.174 Finally, in markets where
166. Cf. Dennis Murray, Seven Ways to Prepare for Managed Care, MED. ECON.
Nov. 27, 1995 at 137, 137 (by working together, physicians can spread their “load”). 
167. See Berwick, supra note 74, at 1230. 
168. See id. Large pools prevent a few patients from skewing costs.  See
Orentlichter, supra note 70, at 169. 
169. See Ken Terry, HMO Deals That Give You More Money for More Risk, MED.
ECON., Dec. 26, 1994, at 30, 31 (stating that 4,000-5,000 patients is not enough to take
on full capitation risk); Philip H. Beard, Make Sure You Won’t Lose Big With Capitation, 
MED. ECON., Mar. 25, 1996, at 50, 50 (for example, a group with 500,000 covered lives 
can predict the capitation rate with such accuracy that it can ensure a profitable rate).
170. See Beard, supra note 169, at 50. 
171. See id. 
172. See Berwick, supra note 74, at 1230. Most MCO managers feel it is
appropriate to place fifteen percent of a physician’s compensation at risk.  See
Orentlicher, supra note 70, at 167-68.  Physicians may also view any compensation
above the risk threshold as a bonus. 
173. See Beard, supra note 169, at 55 (for example, the MCO will generally pay 
less per month when a stop-loss protection is in effect than otherwise); see also
Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 75, at 1028. 
174. See Beard, supra note 169, at 55.  Physicians, however, can still do well in
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competition is fierce, MCOs will not offer stop-loss protections.175 
However, most of these negative aspects can be overcome by legislative
action requiring MCOs to offer stop-loss protections. 
For example, a recent Health Care Financing Administration
(hereinafter “HCFA”) regulation adopted stop-loss provisions for 
Medicare and Medicaid.176  The HCFA implemented two methods for
limiting physicians’ financial risk.  The first provision limits the at-risk
portion of a physician’s income to twenty-five percent; any loss 
exceeding that value is split at a ninety-ten ratio between the health plan 
and physician.177  The second method imposes stop-loss protection by 
providing a maximum amount of loss on a per patient basis.178 
Other stop-loss protection plans extend not to individual patients, but
to a physician’s entire practice or to an entire hospital.179  Accordingly, 
some advocate a stop-loss plan that is based on a percentage of the 
anticipated fee-for-service contract value.180  Under these arrangements,
stop-loss protections would be triggered when a physician’s total 
reimbursement falls below what it would have been under a prior fee-
for-service arrangement.181 
contracts containing this income limitation because they can still earn the same amount
of money that they would have under fee-for-service if they manage their work carefully. 
See id. 
175. See id. at 51.  One of these markets is Long Beach, California.  See id. 
176. See Marlene Cimons, U.S. Acts to Ease HMOs’ Cost Pressure on Doctors’ 
Health, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1996, at A1.  HCFA spokesman Paul Cotton stated “[w]e
want to ensure that managed care does not limit necessary care, and that patients are not 
injured in the process of curtailing costs.” Id. 
177. See Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health
Organizations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,430, 13,440 (1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 417) 
(the 90/10 provision provides some incentive for the physician to continue careful 
regulation of services after the 25% level of loss has been met). See generally Stephen
R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L.
& MED. 399, 425-29 (1996). 
178. See Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health
Organizations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 13,441.  This type of stop-loss protection controls the 
potential amount of loss by stating a maximum amount of income to place at risk for a
given pool of patients. See id. The amount of risk is adjusted to reflect the risk involved 
in different pool sizes taking into account that larger pools have decreased risk.  See id. 
179. See Beard, supra note 169, at 51. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. This system effectively creates a salary, the lower limit, and the 
opportunity to earn a large bonus by keeping health care costs in check. See id. 
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3. Shortened Capitation Periods 
Short capitation periods are a very effective stop-loss mechanism.182 
For example, standing capitation periods and rates may be divided into 
fourths.  A two week flu epidemic bringing most of a physician’s 
patients in for treatment might affect earnings during only one of the 
new shortened capitation periods.  However, compensation for the three 
other shorter periods would not be affected.  Conversely, under the same 
hypothetical, in the unmodified longer period, all of the monies paid to 
the physician under the capitation agreement might well be consumed 
during the short two week period of the flu epidemic.  Thus, four times 
as much money was placed at risk of loss, and in this hypothetical, lost
during that same two week period.  Of course, a patient with serious 
long term illness would still negatively affect the physician’s earnings.183 
Regardless, the physician will not feel a financial pinch and there will
still be the same amount of money contributed by the MCO to patient 
care under either scenario.  Accordingly, the financial risks will fall on 
the MCO rather than the physician. 
4. Compensating the Physician From the Patient’s Enrollment Date 
When a patient enrolls in a health care program, he or she is generally 
given the opportunity to choose a primary care physician.184  Once an
MCO member chooses a physician, capitation payments begin flowing 
to that physician.185 Often enrollees fail to choose a physician until they
actually need medical care.186  Consequently, the MCO, rather than the
treating physician, possesses the funds which should be used to treat the 
patient.187  The physician is thereby forced to provide medical care for 
which he has not been compensated.188 To remedy this inequity, the
182. See Malinowski, supra note 60, at 354. Periods should be as short as one
month. See id. The HCFA adjusts the amount a physician puts at risk based on the 
length of the capitation term.  See Orentlicher, supra note 75, at 169.
183. While a patient with a major illness will still impact a physicians earnings, this 
situation is not so undesirable because physicians are still required to treat patients. 
Additionally, the impact that one sick individual has on a physician’s earning capacity
will encourage the physician to care for all of their patients in order to prevent even a 
single patient from having a costly severe illness. 
184. See Health Care Service Plan Contracts: Hearings on AB 2649 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 7, 1996). 
185. See id.  While it may seem that the doctor is getting something for nothing, in 
reality these payments establish a “pool” of funds from which a patient’s medical needs 
are paid for in the event of an illness.  See id. 
186. See id. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. The California Medical Association argued that such a situation will
protect the patient by providing funds from which they will be provided cared and also 
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MCO should make retroactive capitation payments to the physician 
dating back to the patient’s enrollment date as suggested by the early
versions of Assembly Bill 2649.189  Then, the money which is to be used
for an enrollee’s healthcare would be in the hands of the person actually 
paying for the care.
5. Actuarially Sound Programs 
Finally, the most important aspect of capitation reform is the creation 
of actuarially sound programs.  A physician practicing in an area 
requiring a great deal of medical care is at a severe financial
disadvantage when compared to their counterparts practicing in other
locales.190  Similarly, some experienced physicians, or those with
specialized knowledge, may attract those patients requiring more 
expensive health care.191 
Studies demonstrating that health care costs are predictable suggest
that sound programs are feasible.192  In fact, Medicare programs set 
capitated payment rates based on an average per capita cost which 
reflects age, sex, welfare status, institutionalization and geographic
area.193  Congress requires that federally qualified HMOs set rates in a
way that reflects the needs of individuals or families194 Census data can
be used to determine areas having patient populations with some distinct 
characteristics.195  Capitation plans which minimize risk will reduce
pressure on physicians to save costs by withholding both medical care
and information they are legally and ethically required to disclose. 
protect the physician from non-payment. See id. 
189. See  ASSEMBLY BILL 2649, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (as amended May
29, 1996). 
190. See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 86, at 1706 (comparing the 
difference in a wealthy gay neighborhood from 1978 to 1987). 
191. See id. 
192. See Jinnet B. Fowles, Taking Health Status into Account When Setting
Capitation Rates: A Comparison of Risk Adjustment Methods, 276 JAMA 1316 (1996) 
(finding that the ability to predict expenditures for groups is very good). 
193. See 42 C.F.R § 417.401 (1996); Kinney, supra note 165, at 315-16. 
194. See 42 C.F.R § 417.104(b) (1996).  In classifying the groups, the HMO must
use factors which predict differences in the use of health services.  See id. §
417.104(b)(2)(ii).  Factors which do not reasonably predict the use of health care will be 
disapproved. See id. § 417.104(b)(2)(iii). 
195. A “crude” method for reflecting varying levels of patient risk is basing
capitation rates on age-sex groupings.  See Bodenheimer & Grumbacher, supra note 75, 
at 1028.  Persons in certain age-sex groupings are more likely to use health care than
other groups. See id. 
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Further, this system shifts some risk back to the MCO.  Physicians will
not put their earning potential at risk each and every time they consider 
an expensive or radical therapy plan.196  Under this scenario, traditional
medical malpractice doctrines will serve as a watchdog to influence a 
physician’s medical judgment. 
C. The Next Step 
In addition to revamping the financial incentive legislation, the
legislature needs to take at least one additional step. The legislature 
should require MCOs to disclose financial incentive arrangements and
plan policies and procedures to prospective enrollees.197  While the new
Business and Professions Codes require this,198 mechanisms which 
ensure strict compliance with the goals of the legislation should be
developed.
1. Placing the Burden on the Physician? 
California law requires that the physician explain to the patient many
financial incentives.199  A strong argument can be made that a physician
is the party responsible for distributing information concerning his 
financial incentives, including capitation arrangements.200  First, the
physician is the party that agreed to join the MCO and function at the 
mercy of the agreement.201 Second, when the physician in a capitated
plan makes a medical decision, arguably it is his decision alone, and not 
that of the MCO,202 especially when the agreement is a fully-shifted risk
arrangement.203  Finally, the doctrine of informed consent requires the
physician to explain the medical aspects of the any proposed course of 
treatment, including the impact on the physician’s personal economics. 
196. See Berwick, supra note 74, at 1228.
197. While physicians who will gain financially should be required to provide 
complete information for any patient that switches plans, MCOs should be charged with
that responsibility when the physician isn’t seeking to influence a patient for personal
financial gain. Requiring written disclosure of financial interests in the new health plan 
furthers evidentiary concerns regarding proper disclosure and may be used to indicate the 
physician’s compliance with the appropriate requirements.  Moreover, if true informed 
consent is given to the party seeking to charge a MCO or physician with creating 
reasonable expectations, the documents will memorialize the conversations and aid in the
patient’s ability to meet the strict pleading requirements of fraud.
198. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
200. See Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should
Physicians Be Required to Disclose These to Patients, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1839 (1995). 
201. See id. 
202. See id. 
203. See Pedroza, supra note 52, at 429 n.321. 
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There are many problems with requiring physicians to disclose the 
financial incentives of their contracts. Physicians are not necessarily the
best party to explain the various financial incentives.  A physician’s time
is best spent treating patients, not learning and then teaching the 
intricacies of complicated health care programs to their patients.  Finally, 
by providing information to a patient, a physician might create 
reasonable expectations of increased care or inadvertently influence a
patient to switch health care service plans. 
2. Placing the Burden on the MCO?
Requiring the MCO to explain the financial incentives at the time of
enrollment will help ensure that patients learn how their insurance works 
before they require medical attention. 204  Up front disclosure by the
MCO permits the enrollee to make an informed decision about health 
care options.205  MCOs would educate health care consumers about the
relationship between health care cost and benefits received before 
circumstances become exigent.206  Moreover, patients are generally in 
contact with their insurer well before they ever meet their physician.207 
It is especially important that MCOs educate enrollees in situations
where enrollees have access to more than one health care option or 
provider, or in those situations where stratified insurance options are
present.208  This approach would require setting rigid guidelines209 to 
allow the consumer to “shop” the available plans.  Furthermore, active 
disclosure of MCO rates might affect the movement of enrollees to
MCOs appearing to afford the best care.210  Additionally, active
204. A patient should not be forced to discover that their plan does not cover a 
needed service only at the time when the service is needed.
205. See Malinowski, supra note 60, at 351. 
206. See id. at 352.  For example, under an early disclosure system, patients would 
be informed of the need to purchase supplemental insurance before it becomes “too late.” 
See id. 
207. See id. Shifting the burden of disclosure to the MCO will also require special 
provisions so that the duty to inform does not rest with the employer, but instead with a 
well-versed agent. See id. 
208. See id.  Patients will understand that lower costs may come with decreased
care, and may in fact be willing to bargain for such an arrangement.  While the 
intricacies of such a stratified system are beyond the scope of this comment, it is worth 
noting that legislative reform efforts should contemplate and put the appropriate 
mechanisms in place to regulate such health care plans.
209. See id. 
210. See Kinney, supra note 165, at 323-24. 
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disclosure would help to eliminate subsequent lawsuits based upon the 
theory that a physician inappropriately steered a patient into a more
profitable health plan.211 
IV. CONCLUSION
The California legislature has taken steps in the proper direction.
Limiting financial incentives and prohibiting MCOs from using gag 
orders will help physicians provide quality health care to the citizens of 
California. The legislature, however, failed to achieve the best solution 
to the California health care turmoil.  The Legislature should review its 
efforts. First, it should clear up the ambiguity surrounding both
physician advocacy for patient’s ability to change health plans and 
benefit non-expansion language and, thus, remove the gag order that it 
created.  Additionally, the legislature should limit how much risk the 
doctors are forced to accept and require the MCO to comply with a strict
disclosure requirement before member enrollment.  Only then will the
California patient be afforded appropriate health care. 
PATRICK M. MALONEY
211. Since the MCO, as opposed to the physician, advised the insured of the policy
provisions, there would be less room to argue that the physician manipulated the patient.
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